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Abstract
The revelation principle has been known in the economics society for decades. In
this paper, I will investigate it from an energy perspective, i.e., considering the
energy consumed by agents and the designer in participating a mechanism. The
main result is that when the strategies of agents are actions rather than messages,
an additional energy condition should be added to make the revelation principle
hold in the real world.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in economics theory. Ac-
cording to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(Page 884, Line 24 [1]): “The implication of the revelation principle is ... to
identify the set of implementable social choice functions, we need only identify
those that are truthfully implementable.”
So far, the revelation principle has been applied to many disciplines such as
auction, contract, the theory of incentives and so on. If we move eyes from
economics to physics, it is well-known that the world is a physical world, doing
any action requires energy. In this paper, I will investigate the revelation prin-
ciple from an energy perspective, i.e., studying how much energy is required
for agents and the designer in participating a mechanism. Section 2 and 3 are
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the main parts of this paper. Section 4 draws conclusions. Related definitions
and proofs are given in Appendix, which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D
of MWG’s textbook[1].
2 Energy matrices
Let us consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I (page 858 [1]).
These agents make a collective choice from some set X of possible alternatives.
Prior to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines
his preferences. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θi. The
vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI
according to probability density φ(·). Each agent i’s Bernoulli utility function
when he is of type θi is ui(x, θi). A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a
collection of I sets S1, · · · , SI , each Si containing agent i’s possible actions (or
plans of action), and an outcome function g : S → X , where S = S1×· · ·×SI
(page 883, Line 7 [1]).
At first sight, it is meaningless to discriminate whether the format of agent
i’s strategy is an action or a plan of action, since the two formats of strate-
gies correspond to the same results in the traditional theory of mechanism
design. However, as I will argue in the following discussion, the two formats
of strategies are different from an energy perspective.
For any agent i, if his strategy si(·) is of an action format, I denote by Ea
the energy required for agent i to to choose it (i.e., performing the action).
Otherwise agent i’s strategy si(·) is of a message format (i.e., a plan of action),
in this case I denote by Em the energy required for agent i to choose it (i.e.,
selecting the message).
Generally speaking, an action is laborious, to carry out it requires more energy;
as a comparison, a plan of action is a message, to select it requires less energy.
This is consistent to the common sense in the real world. Therefore, it is
natural to assume Ea > Em. Note the private type of agent i can be reasonably
represented as a message, because agent i can announce it to the designer. In
addition, let Esend be the energy consumed in sending out a message by agents,
and Eg be the energy consumed in performing the outcome function g(·) by
designer.
Now let us consider the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium
given in Proposition 23.D.1 [1]. Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, then f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Let Γdirect = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , g(s
∗(·))) be the corresponding direct
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revelation mechanism. According to the format of agents’ strategies, an action
or a plan of action, there are two different cases:
Case 1 : The strategy is of a message format (i.e., a plan of action).
1) Mechanism Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i selects the strategy s∗i (θi) and
sends it to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I · (Em +
Esend). The designer receives I messages and performs the outcome function
g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Mechanism Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces his/her type as
a message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·Esend.
The designer receives I messages and performs the outcome function g(s∗(·)).
Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Em + Eg.
Case 2 : The strategy is of an action format.
1) Mechanism Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i performs his/her action s∗i (θi).
Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I · Ea. The designer performs the
outcome function g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Mechanism Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces his/her type as
a message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·Esend.
The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function g(s∗(·)).
Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Ea + Eg.
The above-mentioned energy consumed in different cases can be represented
by an energy matrix in Table 1.
Table 1: An energy matrix of I agents and the designer. The first entry de-
notes the energy consumed by I agents, and the second stands for the energy
consumed by the designer.
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤❤
Strategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
A message [I · (Em + Esend), Eg] [I · Esend, I · Em + Eg]
An action [I · Ea, Eg] [I · Esend, I · Ea + Eg]
Usually, Ea is significant, as a comparison Em, Eg and Esend are small. Suppose
Em, Eg and Esend can be neglected, then Table 1 is reduced to Table 2:
Table 2: A simplified energy matrix of I agents and the designer.
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤❤
Strategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
A message [0, 0] [0, 0]
An action [I ·Ea, 0] [0, I · Ea]
In terms of computer science, when agents’ strategies are actions instead of
messages (i.e., plans of action), the complexity of the energy consumed by
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the designer in Γdirect is O(I), which cannot be neglected. Therefore, in order
to make the direct revelation mechanism Γdirect work, an additional energy
condition should be added as follows:
Energy condition: The designer possesses enough energy, at least the sum
of energy that all agents would consume when they participate the original
indirect mechanism Γ.
3 Discussions
In this section, I will analyse two problems facing the designer when agents’
strategies are of an action format:
1) In the direct mechanism Γdirect, does the designer possess enough energy to
carry out all actions that would be consumed by agents in the original indirect
mechanism Γ? (Generally speaking, there are many factors that may be rel-
evant to agents’ actions, e.g., energy, skill, quality, etc. For simplicity, here I
only consider one indispensable factor, i.e., the energy required to carry out
an action.)
According to Page 378, the 9th line to the last [2], “... the mechanism designer
is always at an informational disadvantage with respect to the agents, who,
as a collective entity, know more about the true environment that does the
designer”. Similar to this idea, it looks somewhat “unreasonable” to assume
that the designer is at an energy advantage with respect to the agents, i.e., the
designer possesses enough energy that is not less than the sum of all agents’
energy.
As shown in Table 2, the energy condition is very weak when the strategies
of agents are of a message format. However, when the strategies of agents are
of an action format, the energy condition may be restrictive. The designer
cannot take it for granted that he always has enough energy. When the power
of the designer is restricted such that the energy condition does not hold, the
revelation principle will not hold.
2) Furthermore, even if the energy condition is satisfied, there still exists an-
other problem facing the designer. As shown in Table 2, when the designer
chooses the indirect mechanism Γ, he almost spends zero energy; but if the
designer chooses the direct mechanism Γdirect, he has to spend I ·Ea energy to
make Γdirect work. Note that in the theory of mechanism design, the designer
only care whether and how the social choice function f(·) can be implemented.
Since Γ and Γdirect implement the same f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
then why does the designer have incentives to work harder, i.e., to be willing
to choose Γdirect instead of Γ?
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, two main results are yielded:
1) If the strategies of agents are of an action format, then an energy condi-
tion should be added to make the revelation principle hold in the real world.
Furthermore, it is questionable to say that the designer has incentives to work
harder by choosing a direct mechanism, but finally implements the same so-
cial choice function as he would implemented easier by choosing an indirect
mechanism. Hence, the revelation principle may be not proper when agent’s
strategies are of an action format.
2) If the strategies of agents are of a message format (i.e., plans of actions),
then there is no problem in the traditional framework of revelation principle.
Note: this result holds under the assumption that Em, Eg and Esend can be
neglected.
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Appendix: Definitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Definition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI →
X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (θ1, · · · , θI), assigns a
collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X .
Definition 23.B.3: A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X .
Definition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = Θi for all i and g(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI .
Definition 23.D.1: The strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i[ui(g(sˆi, s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi]
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for all sˆi ∈ Si.
Definition 23.D.2: The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗I(·)), such that g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3: The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s∗i (θi) = θi (for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)).
That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.1)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi.
Proposition 23.D.1 (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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